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INTRODUCTION 
 
Water for municipal use has been characterized as both 
the most valuable and costly type of water services to 
provide (Milliman, 1964).  The ways in which public 
water utilities represent this value and cost in the prices 
they charge has been blamed for important economic 
misallocations and redistribution of income (e.g., see 
Renshaw, 1982, Boland, 1983, Collinge, 1994).1  
References to the water pricing problem began to 
surface in the literature as early as 1938, when Harold 
Hotelling made mention of how to price water in a dry 
country. Ever since, the water pricing debate has been 
focused on prescribing the most optimal way of 
charging for publicly-supplied water, given its large 
fixed costs, its institutional status, and more recently, its 
environmental importance.  Economists have provided 
first-best, second-best, and probably even third-best 
solutions to the utility pricing problem.  However, still 
to this day, pricing theory remains generally 
incongruent with actual rate setting practices.  The 
words of Breslaw (1988) adequately sum up the current 
state of nature in water utility pricing: 
 
"Theoretical niceties are fine for academics, but it is 
the pragmatic requirements of daily existence that 
shapes choice in the real world (p. 376)." 
 
In order to understand this predicament, one must 
carefully analyze the context within which water utility 
pricing takes place.  It is a context that necessarily 
involves interactions of water system functions and the 
functions of price with the differing objectives and 
perspectives of those who demand and supply water.   
 
Water rates and pricing structures embody a mix of both 
broad and specific allocative, environmental, and 
administrative objectives.  Aside from the economic 
efficiency criterion, there is little theoretical guidance 
on establishing a price for water.  Unfortunately, the 
economic efficiency criterion is insufficient for rate 
makers who must incorporate practical and political 
elements into the ratemaking process.  Among other 
concerns, rate makers usually must consider how new 
rates will be perceived by the public, whether the rates 
will recover operating costs, and whether the costs of 
service are allocated fairly among customers.  These 
additional and simultaneous concerns cause rate-setting 
to be a multiobjective process, in which utilities learn 
by doing.  The process can be characterized as a search 
for acceptable rates.  Unfortunately, acceptable rates do 
not represent a clear target.  Acceptability is a vaguely 
defined notion that varies over time and among 
perspectives. 
 
If one may make the assumption that current water 
prices and pricing structures in the United States are 
indeed acceptable, as implied by their very existence 
and the willingness of consumers and regulators to 
tolerate them, then one might blame the search for 
acceptable rates for the ills that plague the water 
industry today.  Over time, deliberate underpricing of 
water has fostered public health and safety and 
economic development, but has led to deferrals of 
operations and maintenance expenditures and 
deteriorating supply systems (Goldstein, 1986).  In 
addition, municipal water districts have been shown to 
earn a low rate of return relative to the opportunity cost 
of capital, which suggests that significant future 
subsidies will be required to maintain the system:  a 
persistent “money-losing” activity (Mercer and Morgan, 
1986).  These and other factors likely play a significant 
role in the recent finding that currently over 80 percent 
of public water systems are considered economically 
nonviable (Dziegielewski, 1997).  Thus, one could 
conclude that acceptable rates are in the eye of the 
beholder and at the heart of a growing resource 
allocation problem. 
 
 
AVENUES FOR NEW WATER PRICING 
RESEARCH 
 
A look through the water pricing literature does not 
yield much information on the actual experiences of 
public water utilities in undertaking substantial rate 
reform.  Typically, the literature is inclined to give 
diametrically opposed expositions on the best ways to 
formulate water rates and rate structures.  Marginal cost 
pricing is usually touted from an economic efficiency 
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perspective, while variants of average cost pricing are 
recommended from rate practitioners that are familiar 
with the technical and administrative constraints of 
utility rate making.  Of course, there are numerous other 
options for pricing water that attempt to optimize some 
specific set of pricing objectives. The literature stops 
short of describing the intricacies of the process and 
commonly only suggests that in developing rates 
utilities must weigh their objectives and strike an 
acceptable balance among competing objectives. 
 
 
To be sure, there is a substantial amount of information 
available with regard to the results of the ratemaking 
process, namely the range of rates and rate structures 
that have been designed and implemented in practice.  
What is missing is sufficient information on the process 
through which a pricing idea becomes a pricing 
alternative and ultimately a pricing policy.  As the water 
utility industry faces the challenges of the new century, 
the water resources research community should make a 
concerted effort to gather and synthesize information 
about the rate-making process.  Such an effort would 
address the following questions: 
 
 
• What is the process that water utilities follow in 
formulating alternative rate structures in actual 
practice?  In what ways does this rate-making 
process vary from utility to utility? 
• How do utilities perceive the need to reform water 
rates?  Is it always revenue driven? 
• How are competing objectives weighted in the rate-
making process?  What are the trade-offs among 
objectives?  How do utilities recognize and 
accommodate the trade-offs? 
• How do objectives and weights vary over time and 
space?  Does the process change with 
circumstances? 
• What are the qualities of an acceptable rate or rate 
structure?  How do these qualities vary over time 
and space?  How do these qualities differ from 
those of an economically efficient rate structure?  
How do water utilities assess the acceptability of 
their new rates? 
• On which metrics can alternative rates and rate 
structures be standardized, measured, and 
compared? 
• Can the acceptability and costs of alternative rates 
be modeled and predicted prior to rate reform? 
 
 
THE NEED FOR A MODEL OF THE RATE 
MAKING PROCESS 
 
 
It is evident that the rate setting process is comprised of  
multiple criteria (e.g., cost recovery, equity, efficiency) 
and numerous tradeoffs (e.g., higher efficiency-less 
revenues, higher ease of implementation-decreased 
equity).  These tradeoffs exist because water rates serve 
more than one economic function. Water rates generate 
revenues, allocate costs, and provide incentives 
(Mitchell and Hanemann, 1994), and as a result serve 
allocational, distributional, and institutional objectives 
(Boland, 1983).  Sometimes alternative rate functions 
can be performed in harmony.  More often, however, as 
Bonbright (1940) pointed out long ago, “the choice of 
one desired objective of rate making makes necessary 
the almost complete abandonment of the other,” and “at 
times, this situation reaches the stage of an almost 
perfect dilemma (p. 388).” 
 
The fact that there exists a menu of alternative rate 
structures strongly suggests that utility ratemaking 
practices are not static.  Indeed, analyses have shown 
that there are visible trends in the choice of rate 
structure over time.  Public water utilities, once bound 
by metering constraints, seem to be dropping flat rate 
and decreasing block rate structures in favor of uniform 
and conservation-oriented rates (Duke and Montoya, 
1993).  The speed of this transition has been more 
pronounced in the West and Northeast, which appears to 
be correlated with scarcity concerns and the need to 
replace aging infrastructure, respectively (Duke and 
Montoya, 1993; Goldstein, 1986).  It is important to 
understand that these are industry trends.  In other 
words, decreasing block rate structures still exist in the 
West, just like flat rates still exist in the East.  All one 
can say at this point is that individual utilities follow 
their own distinct paths in evolving their rates.  To the 
knowledge of the author, not a single study has 
attempted to follow the evolution in rate setting 
practices from the standpoint of the individual utility.2 
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Figure 1.  Variance in Rate-Setting Paths 
 
Figure 1 illustrates the problem at hand, showing 
different paths in water rate structures over time for 
three hypothetical utilities.  Over the same period of 
time, Utility 1 has changed rate structures once, Utility 
2 has changed rate structures twice, and Utility X has 
changed rate structures three times.  The marks along 
the top of each rectangle indicate when there has been 
an adjustment to some element of the corresponding rate 
structure, for example a change in the number, height, 
or width, of consumption blocks, that does not classify 
as a change in rate structure.  The illustration 
exemplifies variance in ratemaking practices, which 
needs to be explained to truly understand the ratemaking 
process.  First, and foremost, what circumstance(s) 
triggered the decision to change rate structures?  
Secondly, what factors influenced the decision to adopt 
the new rate design?  And, how long did the utility 
attempt to adjust the current rate structure before 
yielding to a new design?  Third, why do the ratemaking 
paths differ?  How much of this variance stems from 
situational characteristics, and how much is due to 
differing rate setting objectives, differing views on the 
relative importance of objectives, and the potential for 
achieving objectives?  Finally, how much of this 
variance is due to a differing process for determining 
rates? The answers to these questions are critical to 
understanding the ratemaking process and whether or 
not the “search for acceptable rates” can be improved. 
 
 
SPECULATIVE FRAMEWORK OF THE RATE-
SETTING PROCESS 
 
One might postulate about the make-up of the water 
ratemaking  process  in  absence  of  new  primary  data.    
 
Figure 2 represents a sketch of the potential nature of 
the ratemaking process, which might serve as working 
null hypothesis for future research. 
 
 
Initially, one may assume there arises a need to adjust 
the price (or the set of prices, price structure) of water.  
As indicated in the preceding section, little is known 
about what actually triggers rate reform, and how the 
cause(s) vary from utility to utility.  Regardless, this 
perceived need will determine a primary objective of a 
rate change.  The primary objective (e.g., water 
conservation) is narrowly defined at this stage of the 
game, which allows the ratemaker some freedom to 
propose ways in which the objective can be achieved.  
Initially, then, the problem might take the form of a 
maximization problem, optimizing the choice of water 
rate policy along a single dimension without constraints. 
 
 
As the ratemaker seeks input and approval for his 
proposal, additional secondary objectives surface.  
These secondary objectives represent a broadened 
perspective, which takes into account the values and 
preferences of others involved in and affected by the 
ratemaking process (e.g., the utility manager, utility 
accountants, politicians, and customers).  These 
stakeholders introduce constraints on the fulfillment of 
the primary objective.  For example, the new pricing 
policy must not only encourage water conservation, but 
must also recoup operating costs and be void of cross-
subsidy among customers. Thus, secondary objectives 
become constraints to the initial problem when one must 
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Figure 2.  A Model of the Search for Acceptable Rates  41 
orego (or trade off) the degree of achievement of 
econdary objectives to fulfill the primary objective. 
 
his stage of the ratemaking process ultimately 
roduces a pricing proposal that is considered to be 
enerally acceptable and filtered of undesirable 
lements.  Depending on the number of stakeholders 
nd competing objectives, it may take a long time for 
he rate to make its way through the acceptability filter.  
urthermore, the acceptability filter will likely produce 
 rate proposal that is much different than envisioned at 
he beginning of the process. 
ate approval may represent an extension of the 
cceptability filter if the approving authority or 
embers of this entity were not involved in the earlier 
tages.  For example, the final approval for a change in 
ates may come from a City Council, who can have its 
own pricing objectives and ideas on how these should 
be achieved.  Once an acceptable rate has been 
approved, it is administered (typically through the 
utility’s billing and public affairs departments). 
 
Over time following implementation of the new rate, the 
utility will receive signals and collect and process 
information as to the effectiveness of the new rate in 
fulfilling the primary and secondary objectives.  The 
degree of effectiveness will dictate whether and how 
soon this process will need to be repeated.  Regardless, 
it will be necessary to re-examine rates in the future in 
response to evolving objectives and circumstances 
(Farnkopf, 1996). 
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TOWARD A MULTICRITERIA FRAMEWORK 
FOR CHOOSING AMONG RATE OPTIONS  
 
This speculative model of the water rate setting process, 
and particularly the notion of the acceptability filter, has 
elements of a multidimensional decisionmaking 
problem. Borrowing from statistics, modeling the choice 
of rates is akin to fitting a statistical response surface of 
the consequences of a water pricing decision or policy.  
Figure 3 translates the multidimensional ratemaking 
problem onto a two dimensional surface and creates 
what can be called a web of acceptability.3  A rate or 
rate structure will fulfill to some lesser or greater degree 
many  simultaneous  rate  setting  objectives,  which  are  
 
 
 
represented by the various labeled vectors that begin at 
the origin.  The example shown in Figure 3 scores the 
fulfillment of various objectives arbitrarily along the 
interval [0,1]. As implied above, different rate structures 
and specific characteristics of similar rate structures will 
produce different scores on the multiple criteria, and 
will therefore form differently shaped webs.  The goal 
of the ratemaking process, then, would be to expand the 
frontier of the web along some or all dimensions that are 
relevant to the ratemaker, either by “fine-tuning” 
existing rates or my revamping the rate structure 
altogether. 
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Figure 3.  The Web of Acceptability 
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The ratemaker might be expected to assign more or less 
importance to the objectives depicted in acceptability 
web of Figure 3.  If this is the case, and indeed the 
literature indicates that it is, then the concept of rate 
acceptability can be related through a numeric index or 
scale. An acceptability index, would calculate a total 
score for each of s pricing alternatives (Rs) as a simple 
weighted sum: 
where the scores given to a particular rate setting 
criterion (rsk) are standardized on the interval [0,1] for 
each of q criteria that are assigned policy weights (w).  
The goal of the ratemaker would then be to choose the 
rate configuration that would maximize the weighted 
score, Rs,4 subject to certain constraints.  
 
A primary goal of future pricing research should be to 
determine if, how, and why the components of Equation 
1 differ among utilities, as well as within a single utility 
over time.  Further, such research should seek to 
determine who is involved in the ratemaking process 
and how and to what extent this affects the search for 
acceptability.  If one can (a) learn the components of 
Equation 1, (b) understand variation in and standardize 
the values of these components, and (c) identify and 
establish constraints that are inherent to this process, 
then it will be possible to anticipate the impacts of 
various rate policies.  Hence, it would be possible to 
predict the relative acceptability of various rate policies.  
Such a model would improve on the current process, 
which seems to be based on trial and error. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
The search for acceptable water rates imposes certain 
costs on utilities, ratepayers, and taxpayers, particularly 
when rate-setting objectives are not met, and especially 
when the balancing of multiple objectives does not 
represent the best long-term management of scarce 
water supplies.  However, aside from what is known 
about standard utility practices with regard to revenue 
requirements and cost accounting, little is known about 
the actual process of water rate reform.  In other words, 
there is a lack of understanding of the intricacies of rate 
reform and how public utilities construct acceptable 
rates.  Thus, there exists no framework within which to 
model what is clearly a multicriteria decisionmaking 
process.  Further, there is currently no mechanism 
through which to balance and assess the achievement of 
and trade-offs among multiple rate setting objectives.  
The water industry and its constituents need a way to 
anticipate whether rate reform will result in rates that 
are both acceptable and effective in meeting multiple 
pricing objectives. 
 
This paper has presented important questions for future 
water pricing research and has indirectly proposed some 
first steps in constructing a generalized planning 
framework for rate reform.  A model for constructing 
acceptable water rates and rate structures, which 
embodies multiple pricing objectives and the practical 
considerations of the water utility industry, will lower 
the total cost of water rate reform and may increase 
overall economic efficiency as rate setting objectives 
and trade-off’s become more transparent. 
 
 
REFERENCES 
 
Boland. J. J. 1983. Water/Wastewater Pricing and 
Financial Practices in the United States. Report 
prepared for Near East Bureau, Agency for 
International Development, Washington, DC. 
 
Bonbright, J. C. 1940. Price Policy and Price Behavior: 
Major Controversies as to the Criteria of 
Reasonable Public Utility Rates.  American 
Economic Review 30(May): 379-389. 
 
Breslaw, J. A.  1988.  Does Economic Theory Play A 
Role in Regulatory Decision?  The CRTC Cost 
Inquiry.  Land Economics 64(4): 372-376. 
 
Collinge, R. A. 1994. Transferable Water Rate 
Entitlements: The Overlooked Opportunity in 
Municipal Water Pricing. Public Finance Quarterly 
22(1): 46-64. 
 
Duke, E. M. and A. C. Montoya.  1993. Trends in Water 
Pricing: Results of Ernst and Young’s National 
Rate Surveys. American Water Works Association 
Journal 85(5): 55-61. 
 
Duram, L. A. 1997. A Pragmatic Study of Conventional 
and Alternative Farmers in Colorado. Professional 
Geographer 49(2): 202-213. 
 
Dziegielewski, B. 1997. Personal communication. 
 
Farnkopf, J. W. 1996. Dissecting Rate Structures: 
Identifying Where Further Refinements Are 
Warranted. Proceedings of CONSERV ‘96: 
s
k=1
q
k skR  =    w   r∑ ⋅   (Eq. 1) 
  44 
Responsible Water Stewardship. Denver, CO: 
American Water Works Association. 
 
Goldstein, J. 1986. Full-Cost Water Pricing. American 
Water Works Association Journal 78(2): 52-61. 
 
Hotelling, H.  1938.  The General Welfare in Relation to 
Problems of Taxation and of Railway and Utility 
Rates.  Econometrica 6: 242-269. 
 
Kiefer, J. C. and J. Kocik. 1994. Flood Control 
Readiness Index Measurement System: 
Development and Application of Indexing 
Methodology. Report submitted to the U.S. Army 
Corps of Engineers, Institute for Water Resources, 
Alexandria, VA. 
 
Mercer, L. and W. D. Morgan. 1986. The Efficiency of 
Water Pricing: A Rate of Return Analysis for 
Municpal Water Departments. Water Resources 
Bulletin 22(2):289-295. 
 
Milliman, J. W. 1964.  New Price Policies for 
Municipal Water Service.  American Water Works 
Association Journal 56(2): 125-131. 
 
Mitchell, D. L. and W. M. Hanemann. 1994. Setting 
Urban Water Rates for Efficiency and 
Conservation: A Discussion of Issues. Report 
prepared for the California Urban Water 
Conservation Council. 
 
Renshaw, E.F. 1982. Conserving Water Through 
Pricing. American Water Works Association 
Journal 74(1): 2-5. 
 
Stewart, T. J. and L. Scott. 1995. A Scenario-Based 
Framework for Multicriteria Decision Analysis in 
Water Resources Planning. Water Resources 
Research 31(11): 2835-2843. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ENDNOTES 
 
1. Collinge (1994) goes as far as to suggest that rate 
setting practices are detrimental and comparable to 
“inefficiencies of the sort that plagued Eastern 
Europe and the former Soviet Union under 
communist rule.  Specifically, costs rise, innovation 
lags, and output is not allotted to its highest valued 
use (p.48).” 
 
2. As long ago as 1983, Professor John Boland hinted 
at the need for such a study, suggesting that little is 
known about the overall experience with rate 
changes and pointing to a lack of information on 
how many rate proposals are rejected, modified, or 
approved before a decision is made to change rates. 
 
3. This construct admittedly borrows from the concept 
of the agro-ecological continuum developed by 
Duram (1997). 
 
4. See Stewart and Scott (1995) for an application of 
this technique in the general context of multicriteria 
water resources planning.  Also, see Kiefer and 
Kocik (1994) for a practical application of 
mathematical indexing using standardized scores. 
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